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THE SHADOWS OF FUTURE GENERATIONS 
MATTHEW W. WOLFE† 
ABSTRACT 
  This Note addresses the twin problems of political short-termism 
and intergenerational equity. Although scholars have discussed these 
concerns extensively, few scholars have developed proposals to 
modify democratic institutions—particularly legislatures—to better 
consider posterity’s interests. This Note critiques one such set of 
proposals by several environmental ethicists for including posterity-
oriented legislators in present-generation legislatures. It then proposes 
a system that ties the long-term outcomes of legislators’ policy 
preferences to their pension plans by creating a new commodities 
market that values the decisions legislators make and their effect on 
posterity. 
‘Tis not the concern of a day, a year, or an age; posterity are 
virtually involved in the contest, and will be more or less 
affected, even to the end of time, by the proceedings now.1 
INTRODUCTION 
New Orleans, Louisiana is situated largely below sea level 
between the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain.2 Its geography 
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 1. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 18 (Stanley Appelbaum & Ronald Herder eds., 
Dover Publ’ns, Inc. 1997) (1776). 
 2. GREATER NEW ORLEANS CMTY. DATA CTR., NEW ORLEANS ELEVATION BY 
NEIGHBORHOOD WITH MAJOR ROADS (2005), available at http://www.gnocdc.org/maps/PDFs/ 
neworleans_elevation.pdf. 
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naturally creates the potential for flooding,3 a risk that the region’s 
susceptibility to frequent hurricanes exacerbates.4 Thus, New 
Orleans’s natural environment invites disaster, as destructive 
hurricanes throughout the city’s history have demonstrated.5 A levee 
system was constructed in the 1940s to provide better protection to 
the city, but three subsequent hurricane strikes indicated that New 
Orleans remained vulnerable to flooding.6 After each disaster, 
politicians promised to prevent a similar catastrophe, and each time 
they failed to follow through and adequately fix the levees.7 An 
assessment of the levee system conducted after Hurricane Katrina 
concluded: “New Orleans has now been flooded by hurricanes six 
times over the past century; in 1915, 1940, 1947, 1965, 1969, and 2005. 
It should not be allowed to happen again.”8 
According to a White House report evaluating its aftermath and 
the implications for disaster preparedness relief, “Hurricane Katrina 
was the most destructive natural disaster in U.S. history.”9 The 
estimated property damage was $96 billion with 300,000 homes made 
uninhabitable; 118 million cubic yards of debris were left behind; an 
estimated 1,330 people lost their lives to the storm and ensuing flood 
(with many at the time of the report still missing); the survivors, many 
displaced, have spent years piecing their lives back together. New 
Orleans is not the same—and may never be.10 
 
 3. WHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS 
LEARNED 24 (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf. 
 4. See 1 R.B. SEED ET AL., INVESTIGATION OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE NEW 
ORLEANS FLOOD PROTECTION SYSTEMS IN HURRICANE KATRINA ON AUGUST 29, 2005, ch. 4, 
at 9 (2006), available at http://www.ce.berkeley.edu/~new_orleans/report/VOL_1.pdf (“Since 
1759, 172 hurricanes have struck southern Louisiana. Of these, 38 have caused flooding in New 
Orleans, usually via Lake Pontchartrain. Some of the more notable events have included: 1812, 
1831, 1860, 1893, 1915, 1940, 1947, 1965, 1969, and 2005.” (citation omitted)). 
 5. Id. ch. 4, at 10–11. 
 6. Id. ch. 4, at 11–12. 
 7. See, e.g., id. ch. 15, at 2 (“The northeast flank of the St. Bernard/Ninth Ward basin’s 
protecting ‘ring’ of levees and floodwalls was incomplete at the time of Katrina’s arrival. The 
critical 11 mile long levee section fronting ‘Lake’ Borgne . . . was being constructed in stages, 
and funding appropriation for the final stage had long been requested . . . but this did not arrive 
before Katrina struck; as a result large portions of this critical levee frontage were several feet 
below final design grade.”). 
 8. Id. at xxv; see also WHITE HOUSE, supra note 3, at 9 (“By any measure, Hurricane 
Katrina was a national catastrophe. Similar to the images of grief and destruction on September 
11, 2001, the images of suffering and despair from Hurricane Katrina are forever seared into the 
hearts and memories of all Americans. Those painful images must be the catalyst for change.”). 
 9. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 3, at 5. 
 10. Id. at 7–9. 
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As the Times-Picayune, New Orleans’s local newspaper, 
surmised, “[n]o one can say they didn’t see it coming.”11 The paper 
published a five-part series predicting this type of disaster in 2002.12 
Even the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
recognized this threat as one of the top three most worrisome 
scenarios in early 2001.13 Adequate measures were not taken to 
prevent the tragedy. Thus, when Hurricane Katrina hit, the levee 
system was still defective.14 
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, many policymakers and 
scholars attempted to explain the underlying political and social 
conditions that contributed to the catastrophe.15 Even though they 
recognized that the levee system could fail in the event of another 
hurricane,16 past generations ignored calls after each hurricane for 
 
 11. Bill Walsh, Bruce Alpert & John McQuaid, Feds’ Disaster Planning Shifts Away from 
Preparedness, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 31, 2005, at A10, available at http://www. 
nola.com/katrina/pages/. On top of the masthead for this issue, a tag read “Katrina: The Storm 
We’ve Always Feared.” Id. 
 12. John McQuaid & Mark Schleifstein, Exposure’s Cost, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans), June 25, 2002, at A1; John McQuaid & Mark Schleifstein, In Harm’s Way, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 23, 2002, at J2; John McQuaid & Mark Schleifstein, Shifting 
Tides, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 26, 2002, at A14; John McQuaid & Mark 
Schleifstein, Tempting Fate, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 26, 2002, at A1; John 
McQuaid & Mark Schleifstein, The Big One, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 24, 2002, at 
A1; see also Jim Wilson, New Orleans is Sinking, POPULAR MECHANICS, Sept. 2001, at 42, 42, 
available at http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/research/1282151.html (“During a strong 
hurricane, the city could be inundated with water blocking all streets in and out for days, leaving 
people stranded without electricity and access to clean drinking water. Many also could 
die . . . .”). 
 13. See Eric Berger, New Orleans Faces Doomsday Cenario [sic], HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 
1, 2001, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/nation/1153609.html (“[E]arlier this year [FEMA] 
ranked the potential damage to New Orleans as among the three likeliest, most castastrophic 
[sic] disasters facing this country.”); see also Jia-Rui Chong & Hector Becerra, California 
Earthquake Could Be the Next Katrina, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, at A1 (“[I]n August 2001 . . . 
[FEMA] . . . discussed the three most likely catastrophes to strike the United States. First on the 
list was a terrorist attack in New York. Second was a super-strength hurricane hitting New 
Orleans. Third was a major earthquake on the San Andreas fault.”). 
 14. See generally SEED ET AL., supra note 4, ch. 2 (noting that the levees were “virgin” 
levees constructed on swampy foundation soil and were not completed by the time that 
Hurricane Katrina struck). 
 15. See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE, supra note 3 (policymakers); Symposium, Thirty-Sixth Annual 
Administrative Law Issue, 56 DUKE L.J. 1 (2006) (scholars). 
 16. See Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans: A Flooded City, a Chaotic Response: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 7 (2005) 
(statement of Marty Bahamonde, Regional Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency) 
(labeling Hurricane Katrina as “the worst-case scenario that everyone had always talked about 
regarding the City of New Orleans”); Mark Fischetti, The Drowning of New Orleans, SCI. AM., 
Oct. 2001, at 76, 78 (warning that only an enormous engineering overhaul could prevent a 
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better protection and did not fortify the levee system.17 Politicians 
responded with short-term relief rather than measures that would 
prevent the next disaster.18 The disparity between long-term social 
needs and short-term political will contributed to Hurricane Katrina’s 
eventual devastation.19 
 
catastrophic flood from engulfing New Orleans); John McQuaid & Mark Schleifstein, Evolving 
Danger, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 23, 2002, at J12 (“That margin of error is 
critical because a storm that pushes the lake any higher can force water over the top of the 
levees and inundate the city. The water could rise 20 feet or higher. People would drown, 
possibly in great numbers.”). 
 17. Recognizing this problem, then-Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend wrote 
of Hurricane Katrina: 
We must expect more catastrophes like Hurricane Katrina—and possibly even worse. 
In fact, we will have compounded the tragedy if we fail to learn the lessons—good 
and bad—it has taught us and strengthen our system of preparedness and response. 
We cannot undo the mistakes of the past, but there is much we can do to learn from 
them and to be better prepared for the future. This is our duty. 
WHITE HOUSE, supra note 3, at 65; see also Russell S. Sobel & Peter T. Leeson, Government’s 
Response to Hurricane Katrina: A Public Choice Analysis, 127 PUB. CHOICE 55, 68 (2006) 
(noting the widespread recognition of the inability of the New Orleans levee system to 
withstand a hurricane and attributing the failure to invest in a better system to “political 
shortsightedness bias”). 
 18. See SEED ET AL., supra note 4, ch. 2, at 6 (“Construction of the first phase of the levees 
along this frontage began in the late 1960’s. The last major work in this area prior to Katrina 
had been the construction of the third phase, in 1994-95. Since that time, the USACE had been 
waiting for Congressional appropriation of the funds necessary to construct the final stage . . . . 
Now it is too late.”); Robert J. Meyer, Why We Under-Prepare for Hazards, in ON RISK AND 
DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 153, 156–57 (Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F. 
Kettl & Howard Kunreuther eds., 2006) (“A case example of such a truncated learning process 
might be found in the repeated decisions by state and federal governments to under-fund flood 
control projects in greater New Orleans prior to Hurricane Katrina. . . . Reducing funding 
(combined with cost overruns) forced planned dates of completion to be postponed . . . . In 
addition, recommendations made in 1982 to upgrade the original plan for the height of the 
levees around New Orleans was never funded.”); see also Howard Kunreuther, Disaster 
Mitigation and Insurance: Learning from Katrina, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Mar. 
2006, at 208, 209 (“Extensive evidence indicates that residents in hazard-prone areas do not 
undertake loss prevention measures voluntarily.”). 
 19. See SEED ET AL., supra note 4, ch. 1, at 3–4 (concluding that “global ‘organizational’ 
and institutional problems associated with the governmental and local organizations responsible 
for the design, construction, operation, maintenance and funding of the overall flood protection 
system” contributed to the catastrophe of Hurricane Katrina). Commentators have noted the 
dangerous disconnect between short-term political will and long-term needs: 
This failure to invest current resources for future benefit can be explained by the 
widely-recognized “shortsightedness” bias in government decision making. Political 
decision makers are biased toward current over future benefits. Perhaps nothing 
illustrates this more than the lack of investments made in strengthening the levees 
themselves in the years—even decades—prior to Katrina. The levee system in New 
Orleans was widely-recognized as incapable of sustaining trauma from a major 
hurricane. 
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Political rhetoric boasting that a decision taken in the present 
will have a positive impact on the lives of generations to come is 
appealing. But as the example of New Orleans demonstrates, political 
rhetoric frequently surpasses political action. Levees may protect 
present-generation voters, but future generations also can enjoy the 
benefit of a vibrant, well-protected city that has not suffered a 
catastrophe like Hurricane Katrina. That future generations will 
benefit only if current generations pay is an example of an 
intergenerational externality,20 which leads to an underinvestment in 
disaster protection. After all, future generations do not vote for the 
present-day politicians who make the decisions, even though the 
decisions require a calculated tradeoff among different generations. 
Politicians,21 ethicists,22 scholars,23 and everyday citizens24 often 
champion the needs of future generations on issues from hurricane 
protection to climate change and from pension reform to public 
education. Yet policymaking decisions often do not adequately 
 
Sobel & Leeson, supra note 17, at 68. The issue of a levee system inadequate to withstand a 
strong hurricane is not a local one. See, e.g., Samantha Young, FEMA: Calif. Levees Worse Than 
Thought, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Jan. 4, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/article/2007/01/03/AR2007010302037.html (“Federal and state governments are taking 
another look at widespread flood risks in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.”). 
 20. One economics text defines “externality” as “an effect of one economic actor’s 
activities on another actor’s well-being that is not taken into account by the normal operations 
of the price system.” WALTER NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS 
APPLICATION 530 (9th ed. 2004). In this case, the actors whose well-being is not being 
considered in the price system are future persons. 
 21. See President George W. Bush, President Bush Discusses the Economy and the War on 
Terror (Oct. 16, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031016-
3.html (“I came to this office to confront problems directly and forcefully, not to pass them on 
to future Presidents or future generations.”); President George W. Bush, State of the Union 
Address (Feb. 2, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202-
11.html) (“To build the prosperity of future generations, we must update institutions that were 
created to meet the needs of an earlier time.”). 
 22. See infra Part I.A. 
 23. See Anthony D’Amato, Do We Owe a Duty to Future Generations to Preserve the 
Global Environment?, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 190, 190 (1990) (“A common assumption underlying 
nearly every book or essay on the global environment is that the present generation owes a duty 
to generations yet unborn to preserve the diversity and quality of our planet’s life-sustaining 
environmental resources.”); David A. Weisbach & Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to Symposium 
on Intergenerational Equity and Discounting, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (2007) (“Most analysts . . . 
take the position future generations should count, and most likely count equally to those 
currently alive.”). 
 24. See HARWOOD GROUP, YEARNING FOR BALANCE (1995), http://www.iisd.ca/consume/  
harwood.html (reporting survey results that indicate “Americans are alarmed about the 
future. . . . [and] particularly concerned about the implications of our skewed priorities for 
children and future generations—they see worse trouble ahead if we fail to change course”). 
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represent these needs. Despite general desires to help the future, 
short-term political interests tend to prevail in specific policy 
decisions. In this respect, concerns for posterity resemble basic 
constitutional commitments, such as the right to a trial by a jury or 
the freedom of speech. Most Americans support these commitments 
in general25 but might reject them in particular circumstances.26 To 
prevent a society from succumbing to the sirens’ call to do what is 
expedient rather than what is right, a constitution ties the country and 
its leaders to a legal mast.27 For the interests of future generations in 
contemporary political decisionmaking, however, no such mast exists. 
This Note’s ultimate goal is to provoke legislatures to create 
institutional arrangements that tie legislators to the proverbial mast, 
translating their asserted commitment to posterity into action. 
Legislators require an incentive to legislate for future generations’ 
needs despite the temptation of political expediency. The question 
remains how to design this arrangement to best represent the 
interests of future generations without completely sacrificing the 
present generation’s political autonomy or other shared values.28 
 
 25. See PUB. AGENDA FOR THE NAT’L CONSTITUTION CTR., KNOWING IT BY HEART: 
AMERICANS CONSIDER THE CONSTITUTION AND ITS MEANING 9–10 (2002) (“As a whole, the 
American public recognizes the Constitution as a document that sets an expansive goal of 
freedom . . . . Virtually all (91%) believe that the Constitution’s fundamental purpose is ‘to 
protect and serve the interests of all people, regardless of their wealth or power.’”). 
 26. For example, the concept of due process is almost universally supported in the abstract, 
but the extent to which it should be extended to an “enemy combatant” becomes far more 
contentious in the wake of a terrorist attack. See PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE 
PRESS, AMERICA’S PLACE IN THE WORLD 2005, at 7 (2005), available at http://people-press.org/ 
reports/pdf/263.pdf (“The public is much more tolerant of the use of torture against suspected 
terrorists—46% say it can be often or sometimes justified, while 49% believe it is rarely or 
never justified.”). 
 27. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND 
IRRATIONALITY 93–96 (1984) (“[C]onstitutional democracy is founded upon a set of stable 
institutions that cannot be undone at will once established.”). For the original story of Odysseus 
and his plot to avoid the songs of the Sirens and thus certain death, see HOMER, THE ODYSSEY: 
THE STORY OF ODYSSEUS 138–47 (W.H.D. Rouse trans., Penguin Group 1937) (n.d.). 
 28. These values might include, for example, accountability, Alícia Adserà et al., Are You 
Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 445, 
445–49 (2003), fairness, JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 11–15 (1993), representation, 
REPRESENTATION 3–54 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1968), and sovereignty 
of the people, ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 55–59 (Alfred A. Knopf, 
Inc. 1994) (1835). This type of constitutional revision would inevitably involve a tradeoff, but it 
need not require a complete delegation of political power by the citizens to an actor who exists 
without any temporally based interest, such as an official not accountable to the people. 
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Accepting that legislatures have some obligation to future 
generations, how can they fulfill that obligation?29 
In the American system of government, future generations have 
limited representation.30 In the judicial branch, litigants have 
experimented with representing posterity in judicial processes, 
although the results have been disappointing.31 In the executive 
branch, the interests of future generations exercise some influence in 
agency rulemaking.32 The agency setting occasionally provides a 
forum for the representation of future costs and benefits,33 but the 
 
 29. In keeping with Judge Richard Posner’s call for a more fervent interdisciplinary 
dialogue in legal scholarship, this evaluation should not come solely from environmental 
ethicists or political theorists but also from legal scholars who have a capacity to analyze how 
such a proposal would fit into the traditional constitutional framework. See Richard A. Posner, 
Law, Knowledge, and the Academy: Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1324 
(2002) (“[I]nterdisciplinary legal scholarship is still far from converging with the standard 
academic model, and the progress toward that convergence is slow.”); see also DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 28, at 272–80 (describing lawyers as civic leaders); Jonathan L. Entin, 
The Law Professor as Advocate, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 512, 514 (1987) (“Because the law 
occupies a uniquely powerful niche in the nation’s social and political structure, law professors 
have enjoyed unusual access to the fora in which civic debate occurs.”). Legal scholars might 
also be able to “peel away the veil of academia and plant scholarship firmly in a real-world 
setting.” Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Alan Isaacman and the First Amendment: A 
Candid Interview with Larry Flynt’s Attorney, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 313, 353 (2001). 
 30. For a discussion of how the executive and judicial branches represent, or at least 
attempt to represent, posterity, see Matthew W. Wolfe, Posterity’s Role in Judicial and 
Executive Settings: Its Promise and Shortfalls (working paper, on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). 
 31. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (reciting the standing 
requirement that the plaintiff’s harm be “actual or imminent” rather than “‘conjectural’ or 
‘hypothetical’” (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990))); see also Raymond 
A. Just, Comment, Intergenerational Standing Under the Endangered Species Act: Giving Back 
the Right to Biodiversity After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 71 TUL. L. REV. 597, 622 (1996) 
(“[T]he United States Supreme Court, through application of the same constitutional standing 
requirements which frustrated the plaintiffs in Lujan, likely would limit the effectiveness of any 
legislatively created right of future generations to environmental preservation.”). 
 32. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 
(2000) (requiring agencies to consider the impact of rules on future generations). 
 33. The Office of Management and Budget, for example, identified this analytical 
technique: 
For transparency’s sake, [the analysts] should state in their report what assumptions 
were used, such as the time horizon for the analysis and the discount rates applied to 
future benefits and costs. . . . The ending point [of the calculation of benefits and 
costs] should be far enough in the future to encompass all the significant benefits and 
costs likely to result from the rule. . . . Future citizens who are affected by such 
choices cannot take part in making them, and today’s society must act with some 
consideration of their interest. 
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short time horizons of legislators (who define the role of agencies and 
exercise oversight) or political appointees (who run these agencies) 
limit the effectiveness of agencies in protecting posterity.34 
The legislature remains the best hope for protecting future 
generations. But because legislators are directly and regularly 
accountable to voters, they may be limited in sincerely considering 
future generations in decisionmaking.35 Legislatures, however, make 
policy decisions that have the most direct effect on future 
generations. They answer such crucial questions as whether it is 
worthwhile to spend more money on levees in New Orleans; how 
much should Social Security benefits for present-day senior citizens 
be (and thus, how much burden should the legislature heap on future 
taxpayers); what are the objectives of the country’s public education 
system; what should be done about global warming? Finally, because 
the legislature is the branch best suited to represent the people,36 
posterity representation seems natural. Yet the political 
representation of future generations in the legislative branch has not 
been seriously considered, much less attempted, beyond three related 
proposals by environmental ethicists.37 
This Note converts the existing empty rhetoric about future 
generations into a concrete solution. First, it critiques the 
environmental ethicists’ proposals to elect future-oriented legislators. 
It then proposes a system that creates a market for successful long-
term policy outcomes and ties the legislators’ pension system to the 
success of this market. If a major obstacle to realizing posterity 
 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR A-4, 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS 3, 31, 35 (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/OMB/ 
circulars/a004/a-4.pdf. 
 34. See Tyler Cowen, Caring About the Distant Future: Why It Matters and What It Means, 
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 6 (2007) (“When people are voting or choosing for all future generations as 
a whole, they often behave quite selfishly. Political time horizons tend to be low, often 
extending no further than the next election or the next media cycle.”). 
 35. See infra Part I.B. 
 36. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 327 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“As it is 
essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common interest with the 
people, so it is particularly essential that the [legislative] branch . . . should have an immediate 
dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people.”). 
 37. See infra Part II. 
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representation is that there is no way to represent posterity in the 
legislature, then this Note fills that vacuum.38 
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I examines how 
incentives to focus on short-term concerns39 cause present-generation 
decisionmakers to fail to adequately consider future generations and 
why this intergenerational inequity should concern society. Part II 
summarizes three environmental ethicists’ proposals to designate 
some number of legislators as representatives of future generations 
(F-representatives)40 to represent posterity in the legislature. Part III 
critiques these proposals and then suggests an alternate way to 
encourage lawmakers to legislate for posterity’s interests by tying 
congressional pensions to the long-term performance of their policy 
preferences. By holding legislators accountable for their claims of a 
policy’s benefits to futurity, legislators would better consider the 
needs of future generations in their political calculations. 
 
 38. Professors James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock have addressed the role of morality in 
policymaking: 
Our quarrel with those who would rely primarily on the moral restraint of individuals 
to prevent undue exploitation of individuals and groups through the political process 
is . . . at base an empirical one. The assessment of the nature of man himself will, or 
should, determine the respective importance that is placed on institutional-
constitutional restraint and on moral limitations on the behavior of individuals in 
political society. 
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 305–06 (1962). This Note does not evaluate 
the more radical or more pragmatic proposals that have been voiced that in some way address 
the issues of intergenerational inequity. See, e.g., ROBYN ECKERSLEY, THE GREEN STATE: 
RETHINKING DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY 111–12 (2004) (proposing a radical shift from 
liberal to “ecological democracy” in which “the opportunity to participate or otherwise be 
represented in the making of risk-generating decisions should literally be extended to all those 
potentially affected, regardless of social class, geographic location, nationality, generation, or 
species”); DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM 9–11 (1999) (advocating a pragmatic 
“approach to environmental problems, in which economic analysis is useful, but not 
controlling”). 
 39. This Note refers to this issue interchangeably as political short-termism or policy 
myopia. For a general introduction to this phenomenon, see Toke S. Aidt & Jayasri Dutta, 
Policy Myopia and Economic Growth, 23 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 734 (2007); Iconio Garri, Political 
Short-Termism: A Possible Explanation (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Working Paper 
No. 48, 2007), available at http://www.unicatt.it/Istituti/TeoriaEconomica/Quaderni/itemq0748. 
pdf. 
 40. See Kristian Skagen Ekeli, Giving a Voice to Posterity—Deliberative Democracy and 
Representation of Future People, 18 J. AGRIC. & ENVTL. ETHICS 429, 434 (2005) (advocating to 
reserve seats in legislative assemblies for future generation representatives). 
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I.  THE PROBLEMS OF INTERGENERATIONAL  
INEQUITY AND POLITICAL SHORT-TERMISM 
Almost any newspaper clipping evinces the problem of 
intergenerational inequity; from climate change to failing schools, 
political leaders fail to adequately consider future interests in 
evaluating policy options.41 But this myopia is not the product of a 
lack of a concern for children or future inhabitants of Earth; instead, 
it is the result of institutional constraints that encourage political 
leaders to prioritize the short-term needs of voters. Such an 
institutional arrangement conflicts with a moral commitment to 
future generations. As President Lincoln pronounced: 
[W]e cannot escape history. We . . . will be remembered in spite of 
ourselves. No personal significance or insignificance can spare one 
or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass will light us 
down in honor or dishonor to the latest generation. . . . We, even we 
here, hold the power and bear the responsibility.42 
This Part sets out the moral argument for a commitment to future 
generations and then moves on to examine how policymaking 
exacerbates intergenerational inequity and how the institutional 
configuration of liberal democracies promotes this result. 
A. The Merits of a Moral Commitment to Posterity 
Moral arguments for a commitment to future generations are 
plentiful and diverse. How society goes about defining its moral 
commitment is ultimately important in developing a legislative 
mechanism to represent future generations. This Section outlines 
some of the arguments for recognizing the interests of future 
generations. 
Parents generally desire for their children to be happy and are 
willing to sacrifice to secure this happiness.43 The happiness of these 
children, in turn, depends on the happiness of their children, whose 
happiness depends on the happiness of their children, and so on down 
the family tree. People thus have an interest in their great-great-great 
 
 41. See infra Part I.B. 
 42. Abraham Lincoln, Second Annual Message (Dec. 1, 1862), in 7 A COMPILATION OF 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3327, 3343 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897). 
 43. See Jan Narveson, Future People and Us, in OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 
38, 57 (R.I. Sikora & Brian Barry eds., 1978) (“Most people claim to desire a better lot in life for 
their offspring than themselves . . . .”). 
  
2008] SHADOWS OF FUTURE GENERATIONS 1907 
grandchildren’s lives. But this argument does not explain why people 
should care about future generations rather than only their 
descendants. 
Kantian ethics also promotes concern for future generations. 
Immanuel Kant’s dictate—that humans be treated as ends in 
themselves and not merely as means44—includes posterity. Because 
human beings are inherently interested in achieving this ideal,45 
“[t]hey have a duty to posterity simply because only posterity can 
realise that ideal.”46 
John Rawls similarly advocates a moral obligation to future 
generations in A Theory of Justice, but his concern for posterity is 
more focused than Kant’s, because he advocates passing on a greater 
amount of cultural capital than the present generation received from 
its ancestors.47 Rawls derives this belief from the notion that those in 
the “original position”48 “are understood to belong to ‘any’ and ‘all’ 
generations.”49 Under Rawls’ theory, “[e]ach generation must not 
only preserve the gains of culture and civilization, and maintain intact 
those just institutions that have been established, but it must also put 
aside in each period of time a suitable amount of real capital 
accumulation.”50 This accumulation of capital would continue until a 
 
 44. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 56 [Ak. 231] (Mary Gregor trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797); see also IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 86 (Lewis White Beck ed. & trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1950) 
(1785) (“[E]very rational being exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be 
arbitrarily used by this or that will.”). For a brief summary of Kant’s ideal theory, see Sarah 
Williams Holtman, Kant, Ideal Theory, and the Justice of Exclusionary Zoning, 110 ETHICS 32, 
35–39 (1999). 
 45. IMMANUEL KANT, The Contest of Faculties, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 176, 182 (Hans 
Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d ed. 1991) (1970). 
 46. John Passmore, Conservation, in RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 45, 50 
(Ernest Partridge ed., 1981). 
 47. Id. at 52. 
 48. Rawls’s “original position” is 
a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of 
justice. Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in 
society, his class position or social status . . . his intelligence, strength, and the 
like. . . . The principles of justice are chosen behind [this] veil of ignorance. . . . Since 
all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his particular 
condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain. 
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (rev. ed. 1999). According to Rawls, just rules are 
those that would be chosen from the original position. Id. 
 49. Ernest DeAlton Partridge, Jr., Rawls and the Duty to Posterity (Aug. 1976) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utah) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 50. RAWLS, supra note 48, at 252. 
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steady state of just institutions has been reached.51 Thus, a 
generation’s temporal position does not give it a moral claim over 
other generations’ interests simply because the other generations 
come later.52 
A commitment to future generations also lines up with the 
theory of sustainability in environmental economics.53 Professor Edith 
Brown Weiss defines this norm in the following way: 
The human species holds the natural and cultural resources of the 
planet in trust for all generations of the human species. . . . This 
planetary trust obligates each generation to preserve the diversity of 
the resource base and to pass the planet to future generations in no 
worse condition than it receives it. Thus, the present generation 
serves both as a trustee for future generations and as a beneficiary of 
the trust.54 
 
 51. See Richard A. Epstein, Justice Across the Generations, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1465, 1465 
(1998) (summarizing this phenomenon). 
 52. According to Rawls 
[i]t is a natural fact that generations are spread out in time and actual economic 
benefits flow only in one direction. This situation is unalterable, and so the question 
of justice does not arise. What is just or unjust is how institutions deal with natural 
limitations and the way they are set up to take advantage of historical possibilities. 
Obviously if all generations are to gain (except perhaps the earlier ones), the parties 
must agree to a savings principle that insurers that each generation receives its due 
from its predecessors and does its fair share for those to come. The only economic 
exchanges between generations are, so to speak, virtual ones, that is, compensating 
adjustments that can be made in the original position when a just savings principle is 
adopted. 
RAWLS, supra note 48, at 254; see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL 
STATE 203 (1980) (“[A]ll citizens are at least as good as one another regardless of their date of 
birth.”). 
 53. See Edith Brown Weiss, The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational 
Equity, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495, 498 (1984) (“Our capacity to harm the environment globally 
forces us for the first time to be concerned at a global level with survival of the natural and 
cultural heritage that we pass to future generations.”). 
 54. Id. at 498–99. Professor Brown Weiss further develops this planetary trust concept in 
her book, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON 
PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989), which has stimulated much debate, 
see, e.g., Paul A. Barresi, Beyond Fairness to Future Generations: An Intragenerational 
Alternative to Intergenerational Equity in the International Environmental Arena, 11 TUL. 
ENVT’L L.J. 59 (1997) (critiquing Weiss’ argument); Edith Brown Weiss, A Reply to Barresi’s 
“Beyond Fairness to Future Generations,” 11 TUL. ENVT’L L.J. 89 (1997) (responding to 
Barresi’s article); see also Chairman of World Comm’n on Env’t and Dev., Our Common 
Future, at 24, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (Aug. 4, 1987) [hereinafter 
BRUNDTLAND REPORT], available at http://www.worldinbalance.net/pdf/1987-brundtland.pdf 
(offering another definition of “sustainability” as development that “meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”). 
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There are also a number of arguments against awarding rights to 
or even recognizing the interests of future generations yet unborn. 
First, predictive capabilities erode as the predictor looks further into 
the future.55 Second, predictions about what the future will be like can 
be empirically falsified.56 Third, the number of individuals in any 
given future generation is indeterminate, and the existence of any 
given future individual is contingent upon many factors.57 Fourth, it is 
difficult to predict the needs and wants of future generations; the 
actual quantity of future persons is impossible to predict and thus 
utility calculations are fruitless exercises.58 Finally, society “cannot 
enter into an explicit contract with the community of the future”;59 it 
cannot be sure which future generations will share its “altruistic 
impulses and fellow-feeling” and thus be “members of [its] moral 
community.”60 
Actual experiences have rebutted some of these arguments, such 
as society’s capacity to make predictions.61 Others are not unique; that 
is, they “apply to cases that are both contemporary and morally 
significant (i.e., such features as unidentifiability, improbability, 
ignorance of number, ignorance of tastes and desires, and so on).”62 
Although these arguments have some validity, future generations 
should still be considered and protected in present-day 
decisionmaking. Beyond the recognition of a moral commitment to 
future generations, however, the biggest hurdle to realizing a political 
 
 55. Ernest Partridge, Introduction, in RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS, supra 
note 46, at 1, 7. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Martin P. Golding, Obligations to Future Generations, in RESPONSIBILITIES TO 
FUTURE GENERATIONS, supra note 46, at 61, 65. 
 60. Id. at 66. 
 61. Technology, for example, aids society’s predictive capabilities by allowing it to monitor 
and model the planet’s environment. Thus 
we are not totally blind to the consequences of the technical ventures now at work or 
contemplated. Our age has witnessed not only a revolution in power but also a 
revolution in communications and information processing. From satellites and 
worldwide recording and transmitting stations, we monitor the pulse of the planetary 
organism: the solar input, the hydrological and nutrient cycles, the climatic changes, 
the patterns of land use, and so on. We know what is happening; and, with new 
developments in computer modeling of complex integrated functions, we may be able 
to discover the graver hazards that lie in the path ahead, both for us and for our 
posterity. 
Partridge, supra note 55, at 2. 
 62. Id. at 8. 
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order that respects posterity interests is a positive one—how and why 
future generations are not represented in political decisionmaking. 
The next Section thus details some of the ways in which future 
generations are not properly represented in policymaking processes. 
B. The Existence and Causes of Intergenerational Inequity 
Political action frequently does not match political rhetoric. “It’s 
easy for people to feign concern for future generations and at the 
same time rip them off.”63 And this problem is not unique to 
hurricanes and levees. Daily newspapers are awash with examples of 
this political “short-termism”—the failure of policymakers to 
adequately deal with long-term problems.64 Although there is some 
marginal concern for near future generations, “the future whispers 
while the present shouts.”65 This results in an externality to future 
generations,66 creating intergenerational inequity67 and potentially 
long-run inefficiency. That is, present generations are given 
preferential treatment over future generations, which may be 
concerning from a distributive justice perspective or from an 
economic efficiency perspective. 
The preference for present-generation interests over future 
interests is based on the observer. If one had no affiliation with the 
present, one would not prefer present benefits over future benefits. 
 
 63. Walter E. Williams, Caring About the Future, TOWNHALL.COM, May 15, 2002, http:// 
www.townhall.com/columnists/WalterEWilliams/2002/05/15/caring_about_the_future. 
 64. See, e.g., Do-Nothing Decade, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 4, 2002, at B6 
(climate change); Jed Graham, Delaying Social Security Reform Will Make Problems Far Worse, 
INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, June 1, 2005, at A1 (social security); William C. Symonds, How to Fix 
America’s Schools, BUS. WEEK, Mar. 19, 2001, at 66 (public education).  
 65. AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE 170 (1992). This does not mean that citizens are 
not at all concerned with the effects their actions will have on posterity. Voters and politicians 
often show sincere concern to their children and grandchildren. Ekeli, supra note 40, at 432. The 
situation changes when focusing on more remote generations. Id. “In general, it seems to be 
much more difficult to achieve popular and political support for tough policies that will benefit 
the more distant future.” Id. 
 66. See E. J. Mishan, The Economics of Disamenity, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 55, 56–58 
(1974) (defining external effects or “spillover effects” as a situation in which “person A’s utility 
function . . . is affected by variables over which B, but not A, has control). For a response to the 
argument that these “externalities” are really just necessary investment costs for the upward 
trend in income per capita over time, see Jerome Rothenberg, Intergenerational Ethics, 
Efficiency, and Commitment, in DISCOUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 103, 107 
(Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyant eds., 1999). 
 67. This phenomenon need not only be experienced by distinct sets of individuals but can 
also arise between present and future selves. 
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American legislators, in contrast, have strong ties to the present and 
thus have strong incentives to avoid dealing with future problems. 
Thus, legislators do not deserve all the blame for their inaction. As 
rational political actors, they are only making choices that will 
promote their interests. “Because politicians are concerned with 
getting reelected, they have limited time horizons, leading them to 
‘prefer policies that yield tangible benefits for constituents in the near 
term.’”68 A policy that will not ripen until after the next election (or 
worse, after the actor’s political career) has about as much value as a 
bank note that will not mature until several generations after its 
holder’s death. “[P]oliticians in democratic states, who are elected for 
relatively short periods and who are judged by voters largely in terms 
of the immediate results of their actions, also have strong incentives 
to overdiscount the future in the policy-making process.”69 
Consequently, their viewpoints are necessarily shortsighted, and 
future generations cannot intervene. “We act as we do because we 
can get away with it: future generations do not vote; they have no 
political or financial power; they cannot challenge our decisions.”70 
Anthony Downs’s seminal work on the issue-attention cycle71 
demonstrates that a politician’s policy need only be effective—or give 
the promise of effectiveness—for so long as the public is interested in 
the issue. 
Even if, down the road, the issue returns to the forefront of 
political conversation, blame for the failure to deal with the issue 
properly the first time is often misdirected at officials currently in 
power.72 And if the public properly blames the responsible officials, 
these officials probably are no longer in power;73 they can no longer 
do anything about the problem. If the problem is to be solved, the 
question becomes who is going to deal with it this time around. Thus, 
American political society has grown accustomed to shirking the 
weightier problems of the day, putting the problems off to a later time 
 
 68. Ben Depoorter, Horizontal Political Externalities: The Supply and Demand of Disaster 
Management, 56 DUKE L.J. 101, 111 (2006) (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE 137 
(2004)). 
 69. Gregory S. Kavka & Virginia Warren, Political Representation for Future Generations, 
in ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 21, 28 (Robert Elliot & Arran Gare eds., 1983). 
 70. BRUNDTLAND REPORT, supra note 54, at 24. 
 71. See Anthony Downs, Up and Down with Ecology: The ‘Issue-Attention Cycle,’ 28 PUB. 
INT. 38, 38 (1972) (noting that public attention may generate public pressure to effect change). 
 72. Id. at 47. 
 73. Id. 
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when the consequences for inaction are more immediate and the 
range of options is more limited. 
This discussion does not suggest that the legislative process does 
not consider the interests of future generations. In fact, almost all 
cost-benefit analyses take future costs and benefits into consideration, 
irrespective of whether the costs and benefits will apply to present-
generation constituents or prospective ones.74 Some might apply what 
economists call a discount rate, which compares the value of a future 
preference to the value of a present one.75 But focusing on the 
question of how to arrive at the proper discount rate, as seems to be 
the concern of economists and legal scholars,76 ignores the larger 
question of how to get political actors to concern themselves with the 
costs and benefits to posterity and translate these concerns into policy 
preferences. The proper discount rate matters only if it is the one 
actually used to make—not just analyze—policy choices. In other 
words, if policymakers read a policy report with a zero discount 
rate—meaning that future preferences are weighed evenly with 
present ones (ignoring inflation)—but then effectively discount the 
future benefits in their policy actions, the discount rate is not 
controlling. 
 
 74. But this is only true for the policy analysis. The legislator is then free to determine the 
value to put on competing interests. Critical in this evaluation will be the way in which a cost or 
benefit is likely to affect the legislator’s constituency. 
 75. For a fuller and more complete discussion of the economic principles behind 
discounting, see generally Geoffrey Heal, Discounting: A Review of the Basic Economics, 74 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 59 (2007). But at least one prominent report on climate change uses a discount rate 
of zero, meaning that a future person is valued the same as a present person. See NICHOLAS 
STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 31–33 (2006), available at 
http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk./independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/ 
stern_review_report.cfm (“We take a simple approach in this Review: if a future generation will 
be present, we suppose that it has the same claim on our ethical attention as the current one.”); 
see also William Nordhaus, Critical Assumptions in the Stern Review on Climate Change, 317 
SCIENCE 201, 201 (2007), available at http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/nordhaus_stern_science.pdf 
(concluding that the Stern Review’s proposal to move up the timetable on emissions reductions 
as compared to other reports “stems almost entirely from its technique for calculating discount 
rates and only marginally on new science or economics”). 
 76. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, 
Money, and Intergenerational Equity, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 171, 171 (2007) (“To be sure, cost-
benefit analysis with discounting can produce serious problems of intergenerational 
equity . . . .”). 
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II.  THE ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICISTS’  
POSTERITY-ORIENTED LEGISLATURES 
The Preamble to the United States Constitution explicitly 
references posterity: 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect 
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the 
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and 
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.77 
Some scholars have called for a larger role for the Constitution’s 
Preamble in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.78 The Court, 
however, does not consider the Preamble precedent.79 Still, because of 
its express reference to posterity, the Preamble seems the most 
appropriate starting place for institutional reform.80 
The idea of political representation of future generations through 
the legislature is not new.81 There have been at least three calls for 
“some seats in a democratically elected legislative assembly . . . to be 
reserved for representatives of posterity.”82 The response, critical or 
 
 77. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added). 
 78. See, e.g., Arthur S. Miller, Nuclear Weapons and Constitutional Law, 7 NOVA L.J. 21, 27 
(1982) (“The time has come to think seriously about giving substantive content to the 
preamble.”); Charlie Ogle, Executive Dir., Constitutional Law Found., Preamble: Relevance to 
Environmental Law: Does the United States Constitution Provide Environmental Protection?, 
Presentation at the L.A.W. Public Interest Law Conference at the University of Oregon (Mar. 
7, 1998) (transcript available at http://www.conlaw.org/prearg2.htm) (arguing, in the context of 
environmental policy, that “the Preamble most clearly lays out the vision and wishes of the 
framers and adopters of the Constitution” and that “both the spirit and words of the Preamble 
direct our government to protect the interests of posterity”). 
 79. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905) (“Although th[e] Preamble 
indicates the general purposes for which the people ordained and established the Constitution, 
it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on the Government 
of the United States or on any of its Departments.”). 
 80. Professors James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock define a constitution as “a set of rules 
that is agreed upon in advance and within which subsequent action will be conducted.” 
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 38, at vii. 
 81. See Kavka & Warren, supra note 69, at 21–39 (discussing “the question of political 
representation for future people”). 
 82. Ekeli, supra note 40, at 430. This Note does not discuss a proposal made by Professor 
Dennis Thompson for a “Tribunate (for Posterity),” Dennis F. Thompson, Democracy in Time: 
Popular Sovereignty and Temporal Representation, 12 CONSTELLATIONS 245, 256–57 (2005), 
because the approach is not developed well enough and it does not seem to be confined within a 
legislature, instead acting more like an independent commission. This Note also does not 
address related proposals to create age-differentiated political rights, proxy votes for children, 
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confederate, has been fairly muted.83 This Part describes the three 
proposals of the individual proponents separately to showcase the 
range of forms a posterity-oriented legislature might take and to 
examine the progression of the proposal. 
A. Kavka and Warren’s Proposal 
Professors Gregory S. Kavka and Virginia Warren were the first 
scholars to propose designating legislative representatives for 
posterity, although the two other proponents of that idea do not 
acknowledge their contribution. Writing together in a volume on 
environmental philosophy, Professors Kavka and Warren begin with 
the premise that future generations are not represented in the 
present-generation political conversation.84 They then move on to the 
normative question of whether future generations ought to be 
represented, concluding that 
because the choices which democratic societies make now have 
enormous impact on future generations, and because we collectively 
know this and can make better than random guesses about the long-
 
or policies that encourage reproduction, all which would increase the proportion of children in 
the voting population and thereby lessen the disproportionate impact older voters have in 
political decisions. See Philippe Van Parijs, Rawls and Machiavelli: The Dream Team? (June 
1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (discussing these 
proposals). 
 83. See Kavka & Warren, supra note 69, at 21 (noting that even normative theories focus 
on current interests, ignoring future people’s interest). Commentators have invoked the future-
oriented legislature proposals, however, in discussions of deliberative democracy. E.g., AMY 
GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 155–63 (1996) 
(discussing “several different responses to the problem of representing future generations”); 
Hans von Rautenfeld, Thinking for Thousands: Emerson’s Theory of Political Representation in 
the Public Sphere, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 184, 191 n.8 (2005) (“Thompson lists possible 
constituencies for elected representatives: the nation, a political party, the district as a whole, 
the electoral majority in the district, and individuals who make direct appeals. This list is 
expanded in Gutmann and Thompson to include future generations.” (citations omitted)). 
Part of the explanation for the lack of exploration of future-generation representation is 
that this subject lies at the crossroads of numerous academic disciplines. See Wolfe, supra note 
30. Even when commentators are willing to take this problem head-on, a chasm remains 
between the different disciplines. Ethicists argue why society should care for future generations 
and even offer the mechanisms for this intergenerational altruism. Social scientists explain why 
these preferences, when present, are muted in the traditional political landscape. But far less 
attention has been paid to reshaping political institutions to better contemplate these long-term 
preferences and thus to recognize the interests—and value—of future generations. 
 84. Kavka & Warren, supra note 69, at 21. 
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range outcomes of different choices, it is appropriate at this time to 
raise the question of political representation for future people.85 
Their proposal begins by responding to the theoretical objection86 
that a present-generation party cannot represent future generations.87 
Citing legal examples of attorneys representing those without the 
ability to express their interests, such as deceased persons or unborn 
trust beneficiaries, Professors Kavka and Warren argue that the only 
precondition of representation is that the represented “hav[e] 
interests . . . capable of faring well or faring ill” at some point along 
the time continuum.88 Regarding the concern of the inability to 
represent the interests—with certainty—of those not yet born, the 
proposal assumes the representative need only “know enough about 
the likely interests of the represented party and the means of 
promoting those interests, to be able to make better than random 
judgments about how alternative policies are likely to affect the 
interests of the represented party.”89 
Finally, the article addresses some of the practical objections to 
setting aside legislative seats for posterity interests, admitting that 
“[i]t is likely to seem unacceptable to most people because it is novel, 
sounds radical, has never been tried anywhere, and because it is not 
clear how or whether it would work if put into practice.”90 In response 
to its critics, the article lays out a concrete method by which a handful 
of representatives in each chamber of Congress could serve the 
interests of future generations: these representatives would advocate 
posterity interests by performing the same tasks as any other 
representative.91 The article proposes that presidential appointment 
or national election would choose the future representatives.92 
 
 85. Id. at 22. 
 86. See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text. 
 87. Kavka & Warren, supra note 69, at 22–23. 
 88. Id. at 23–24 (emphasis omitted). 
 89. Id. at 25. The proposal also addresses the concern of including future generations in the 
political process when so many other articulable groups or interests are still overlooked—
specifically, children, later selves, past citizens, and foreigners. Id. at 26–33. It concludes that 
these interests are distinguishable from future generations. Id. 
 90. Id. at 34. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 34–35. 
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B. Dobson’s Proposal 
Unlike Kavka and Warren, who advocate for future generations 
over other unenfranchised groups,93 Andrew Dobson frames his 
proposal within the general goal of promoting political representation 
of all unrepresented interests.94 As such, his article discusses the 
representation—its democratic nature and specific design—of three 
constituencies “that render problematic current understandings of the 
way representative democracies should function”: nonnationals; 
future generations; and “other species,” which might range from 
nonhuman animals to the natural environment.95 
In his section on future generations, Dobson quickly dismisses 
the objections to the political recognition of future people and their 
interests.96 “The big problem, though, is that future generations 
cannot vote and can provide no representatives.”97 Therefore, he 
proposes drawing proxy or substitute future generations from the 
present generation.98 This proxy would serve as the electorate and 
candidates would be drawn from it.99 As for who would comprise this 
proxy future electorate, he proposes two options: (1) a random 
sample of present generation voters; or (2) a lobbying group in the 
present generation that is concerned about future generations, such as 
the environmental sustainability lobby.100 The first option would 
provide “no guarantee that the interests of future generations would 
in fact be represented by such a random sample,” potentially leading 
to present generations favoring their own interests when they conflict 
and using the extra clout to serve their own needs.101 He thus favors 
the second option,102 even at the expense of the democratic ideal of 
keeping political power in the hands of ordinary people and out of the 
hands of experts.103 According to Professor Dobson, sacrifice of this 
 
 93. Id. at 26–33. 
 94. Andrew Dobson, Representative Democracy and the Environment, in DEMOCRACY 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 124, 124 (William M. Lafferty & James 
Meadowcroft eds., 1996). 
 95. Id. at 124–25. 
 96. Id. at 131–32. 
 97. Id. at 132. 
 98. Id. at 132–33. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 133. 
 102. Id. at 133–34. 
 103. Id. at 134. 
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particular ideal is justified because it is the only way to adequately 
represent future generations and because it will provide the proxy 
electorate with candidates who will actually represent future 
generations.104 Professor Ekeli later terms Dobson’s approach the 
“restricted franchise model” because it does not offer all voters the 
right to elect F-representatives, instead reserving voting rights to 
present-generation proxies for future generations.105 
Next, Dobson addresses the concern that the environmental 
sustainability lobby, in advocating population growth measures, might 
actually reduce the number of those they are supposedly 
representing.106 He responds that (1) environmentalists disagree on 
population growth and that their disagreement would play out in a 
healthy democratic forum, and (2) future generations “will at least be 
in favour of policies that guarantee them the environmental 
conditions within which to exercise their political autonomy.”107 As to 
how future interests would be analyzed, he quickly dismisses 
discounting because “there is no discernible reason for regarding 
future human beings as any less equal than present ones, in which 
case representing their interests indirectly through present generation 
sympathizers amounts to an injustice.”108 
C. Ekeli’s Proposal 
Building off of Dobson’s model, Professor Ekeli proposes a more 
expansive version of posterity representation in the legislature.109 He 
justifies this model with general concern that deliberative democracy 
is illegitimate without posterity’s voice and without the added value 
the representations of future generations would bring to policy 
decisions.110 Specifically, Professor Ekeli proposes that “some seats in 
the legislative assembly (for instance 5 percent) should be reserved 
for future generation representatives.”111 The general voting populace 
would elect these future-generation representatives (F-
 
 104. See id. at 133 (suggesting that a lobbying group will present “a real range of options to 
choose from and therefore the alternatives, in the guise of proxy candidates, necessary for 
accountability to be meaningful will be available“). 
 105. Ekeli, supra note 40, at 434–35. 
 106. Dobson, supra note 94, at 133. 
 107. Id. at 133–34. 
 108. Id. at 135. 
 109. Ekeli, supra note 40, at 430–31. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 434. 
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representatives), who would then function as ordinary legislators.112 
With each voter having two votes—one for the present-
representatives and one for the F-representatives—the candidates 
would attempt to sway them by “present[ing] the ends and means 
they will advocate in the legislative assembly so that the electorate 
would have the opportunity to consider their political programs.”113 
In addition to these requirements, Professor Ekeli would allow a 
supermajority of F-representatives to delay, but not block, a proposal 
for some period of time or until elections occur.114 Professor Ekeli 
offers three reasons in support of his “extended franchise model”: (1) 
expertise about future-oriented issues will improve the public 
dialogue, (2) F-representatives will serve as stewards of future 
generations in present political decisionmaking processes, and (3) 
political institutions will be more future oriented.115 
All three sets of proposals share the common idea that future 
generations should be represented in a legislature by representatives 
elected solely to identify and stand for their interests. The core idea is 
similar to agency delegation in that it encourages consideration of 
future interests; it even more closely resembles the notion of posterity 
standing in that the future can be represented by present delegates. 
III.  CRITIQUING ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICISTS’  
PROPOSAL AND SUGGESTING A POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE  
Section A begins by critiquing the environmental ethicists’ 
proposal to create a posterity-oriented legislature. Section B then 
uses these lessons as a springboard to propose a different way to 
encourage legislators to consider posterity’s interests. It advocates 
creating a performance-based pension system that rewards (and 
punishes) legislators for policy choices based on the long-term 
outcome of those choices and how those choices are predicted to 
affect the future. 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 441. 
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A. The Promise and Shortfalls of the Environmental Ethicists’ 
Posterity-Oriented Legislatures 
This Section critiques the idea of posterity-oriented legislatures, 
which have largely avoided review.116 It first addresses several major 
questions regarding posterity-oriented legislatures. These questions 
range from how many F-representatives to elect to how to hold these 
representatives accountable. It then addresses some of the potential 
political effects, both discursive and instrumental, that might result 
from implementing posterity-oriented legislatures. 
1. Theoretical and Practical Concerns.  Many of the concerns 
with F-representatives depend on how they would be structured. 
There are a number of theoretical and practical questions. 
a. The Number of Representatives to Be Apportioned to Future 
Generations.  What is the proper role of discounting the political 
equality of future generations? If the representative is truly 
representing all future generations and not just one future generation, 
the claimed constituency will dwarf the present-generation 
constituency.117 Given the massive size of this future-generation 
constituency, there must be a compromise between the desire to give 
future generations political equality with present generations and the 
desire to ensure that present generations retain a political voice. Such 
a compromise might employ a type of discounting so that “[future] 
representatives in present parliaments will be many fewer in number 
than the numerical weight of their interests would warrant.”118 On the 
other hand, an inadequate apportionment of F-representatives would 
continue to prevent future generations from having any opportunity 
to influence policy or even block potentially harmful decisions.119 If a 
compromise cannot be reached that balances the intergenerational 
competition of political power, the model becomes untenable.120 
b. F-Party Membership.  Professor Ekeli proposes that future 
parties (F-parties) would be able to put forward F-candidates, and 
 
 116. But see id. at 434–35 (critiquing Dobson’s model). 
 117. Dobson, supra note 94, at 135; Ekeli, supra note 40, at 442. 
 118. Dobson, supra note 94, at 135. 
 119. Ekeli, supra note 40, at 442. 
 120. Id. 
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these F-parties’ establishment would be regulated by “inclusive” 
norms, which would incorporate diverse viewpoints but would also 
prevent powerful interest groups from exploiting the system.121 In a 
footnote, Professor Ekeli refuses to define the legal standard for F-
party membership, instead passing that question to “democratically 
elected legislators.”122 But Professor Ekeli seems to trust the very 
same legislators whose political livelihoods depend on current-
generation voters and who cannot resist the coercive influence of 
special interest groups. If legislators were allowed to define the legal 
standard for these parties, they would likely do so with these 
constituencies in mind. 
Under Professor Ekeli’s model, in addition to these interest 
groups, present-generation political parties also would be excluded 
from the list of eligible F-parties to prevent duplicity.123 From the 
statements made in the three proposals,124 it seems that only those 
that lack sufficient influence in the traditional regime, such as perhaps 
the sustainable development lobby, would be eligible to establish F-
parties. But if only the disenchanted are allowed to form these F-
parties, they might seize this opportunity to represent their own 
short-term needs.125 A system in which present-generation voters 
could directly choose these F-representatives would increase 
accountability and democratic legitimacy but also decrease the 
possibility of enfranchising the disenfranchised. 
c. F-Representatives’ Electorate.  Professor Ekeli argues that 
Professor Dobson’s model is countermajoritarian because it allows 
certain elites to have twice the number of votes as the rest of the 
 
 121. Id. at 437–38. 
 122. Id. at 438 n.11. Ekeli also states that these norms would be enforced by judicial review, 
although he admits the paradox of giving unelected judges this discretion to make the law. Id. at 
438. 
 123. Id. at 438–39. 
 124. See supra Part II. 
 125. The value of having agencies do the cost-benefit analysis is that special interest groups 
cannot as easily influence the administrative rulemaking process. The price of the insulation 
from special interest is a loss of direct accountability in having unelected officials develop 
policies. There is still, however, a possibility of the regulated industry exerting control over the 
regulatory process—agency capture. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION 3 (2d ed. 1971) (providing the classic definition of agency capture); see also Jean-
Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of 
Regulatory Capture, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1089, 1094 (1991) (developing a model that evaluates the 
role of interest-group power and agency politics on the extent of agency capture). 
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electorate.126 Dobson suggests that a lobbying group or even a random 
sample of the population should elect the F-representative.127 This 
method, Professor Ekeli argues, would violate the historic and 
constitutional concept of voting power equality.128 
Professor Ekeli’s model solves this problem by giving everyone 
two votes: one for a present-representative and one for a future 
representative.129 Although this approach maintains political equality, 
it assumes that present generations will somehow be able to 
distinguish future-oriented concerns from their own short-term needs. 
The notion that present-generation voters will elect representatives 
who are concerned with future interests, without further restraint on 
the voters or the representative pool, is a fiction because voters tend 
to discount long-term benefits in favor of short-term ones.130 
Even if the F-representatives were not at all concerned about 
present public opinion, it would be irresponsible for F-representatives 
to support legislation unlikely to garner “public support over the long 
haul,” as the scheme probably would not achieve the goals of the 
legislation if future generations then excised it.131 Because it is 
unlikely that voters would opt for future over present needs, without 
some incentive, Professor Ekeli’s proposal would monitor the 
election of F-representatives so that the choice would be between the 
greater of two goods. But this choice is dependant on the quality of 
candidates running to be F-representatives. 
d. The F-Representatives.  If the electoral system limits the 
candidacy of F-representatives to individuals with certain qualities 
(Dobson, for example, might limit candidacy to the sustainable 
 
 126. Ekeli, supra note 40, at 435. 
 127. Dobson, supra note 94, at 132–33. 
 128. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (“The conception of political equality 
from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, 
Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”); 
Ekeli, supra note 40, at 434–35 (describing Dobson’s model as one of “restricted franchise” 
because the environmental sustainability lobby elects the F-representatives). Dobson’s model 
would give some members of the electorate more than one vote and thus violate the “one 
person, one vote” rule. See Gray, 372 U.S. at 381 (laying out the rule). 
 129. Ekeli, supra note 40, at 434. 
 130. See SAMUEL MERRILL & BERNARD GROFMAN, A UNIFIED THEORY OF VOTING: 
DIRECTIONAL AND PROXIMITY SPATIAL MODELS 130 (1999) (describing “the Grofman 
discounting model in which voters evaluate candidates by proximity but only after discounting 
their claims or their capacity to move the status quo to their preferred policy position”). 
 131. FARBER, supra note 38, at 153, 157. 
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development lobby132), it would have to judge which type of ideology 
best represents posterity.133 The problem with this solution is that it 
mutes public discourse on how best to solve future-oriented problems 
and gives one particular lobbying group a tremendous amount of 
influence.134 As Professor Ekeli notes, 
[e]nvironmental organizations not only make special claims to care 
about posterity, but also express particular views on what this 
involves—views that are open to debate. They normally assume that 
some form of environmental protection best realizes the interests of 
future generations, where their more technologically optimistic 
opponents might claim that this will not serve future interests at all. 
Much of the debate between environmentalists and their opponents 
is not about whether we should be concerned about future 
generations, but how we should meet their interests. 
Environmentalists represent just one strand in that debate.135 
In addition to the problem of drawing F-representatives from a 
particular candidate pool, these F-representatives might also begin to 
share the same short-term political concerns fatal to present-
generation legislators. In response to the concern that F-
representatives will spend their time in office pandering for votes in 
the next election, Professor Ekeli considers limiting F-representatives 
to one term in office although he ultimately rejects the term-limit.136 
But this would not solve the problem, because voters would simply 
shift their retrospective voting behavior from candidate centered to 
party centered.137 Furthermore, this would undermine any 
accountability that installing F-representatives in the legislature 
would offer. 
e. Considerations of F-Representatives.  As Professor Ekeli 
notes, determining what should be done about the future is based on 
shaky and controversial evidence, such as questions of what values to 
consider and how much weight to give those values, and difficult 
 
 132. Dobson, supra note 94, at 133. 
 133. See Ekeli, supra note 40, at 436 (describing a system in which the electorate is forced to 
vote for candidates that are the most likely to promote the interests of future generations). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 136. Id. at 439–40. 
 137. See JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF 
POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA 48–50 (1995) (“The candidate’s party affiliation . . . provides a 
very inexpensive way to infer a great deal . . . .”). 
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moral and political concepts.138 But this might be a reason to prefer F-
representatives. The uncertainty associated with considering future 
interests may be more palatable in a legislative setting that sometimes 
requires soft decisions. 
As to the extent to which society should weight the interests of 
posterity, ethicist Daniel Callahan offers the following possibilities: 
a. Do nothing which could jeopardize the very existence 
of future generations. 
b. Do nothing which could jeopardize the possibility of 
future generations exercising those fundamental rights 
necessary for a life of human dignity. 
c. If it seems necessary, in the interests of the existing 
rights of the living, to behave in ways which could 
jeopardize the equivalent rights of those yet to be 
born, do so in that way which would as far as possible 
minimize the jeopardy. 
d. . . . [C]alculate . . . whether an act with uncertain 
consequences would be harmful to one’s own children. 
If you would not conjure up the possibility of magical 
solutions occurring to save your own children at the 
last moment from the harmful consequences of your 
gambling with their future, do not do so even with 
future generations.139 
The choice of norms greatly affects the outcome and effectiveness of 
the proposal. 
f. Holding F-Representatives Accountable.  The value of having 
F-representatives in a legislature is that they might be accountable to 
the interests of posterity. Without this accountability, the ability of F-
representatives to effectively represent future interests breaks down. 
In his classic text, Professor H.B. Mayo simplifies the concept of 
democratic representation to three simple requirements.140 
Democratic representation exists when there are “(a) legislators (or 
decision-makers) who are (b) legitimated or authorized to enact 
public policies, and who are (c) subject or responsible to public 
 
 138. Ekeli, supra note 40, at 437. 
 139. Daniel Callahan, What Obligations Do We Have to Future Generations?, in 
RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS, supra note 46, at 73, 83–84. 
 140. H.B. MAYO, AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 103 (1960). 
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control at free elections.”141 The problem for the posterity-oriented 
legislature proposal is that those whose interests the decisionmaker is 
representing are not the same as those who are holding the 
representative accountable. If that is so, are the representatives only 
representing the current interests of those who elect and reelect 
them? 
2. Mixed Ex Ante Political Effects.  Additionally, implementing 
a posterity-oriented legislature likely would have drastic and difficult-
to-predict implications for the traditional political process. This 
Section describes what some of these effects might be. 
First, the presence of a posterity-oriented legislature with its F-
representatives might enhance the political conversation by forcing 
discussion of future-oriented issues.142 The double vote—voting once 
for a present-representative and once for an F-representative—would 
“promote more regular public debate about environmental problems 
in general and issues affecting the near and distant posterity in 
particular.”143 This might prove effective because “there is 
considerable evidence that people’s preferences and perspectives 
change in response to inputs of additional information—particularly 
during political campaigns. If these assumptions are correct, the 
double-vote can make the interests and needs of future generations 
more ‘imaginatively present’ in the minds of the voters.”144 
Implementing F-representatives might also affect present-
oriented legislators and their strategy. Many legislators rely on the 
ability to point fingers at previous administrations or regimes to 
deflect criticism.145 Their related ability to defer action on important 
policy issues that affect future generations functions as a political 
externality, “the ability of some groups to use the power of 
government to transfer benefits to themselves without being forced to 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. See John Ferejohn, Instituting Deliberative Democracy, in DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONS 75, 98 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., 2000) (“Reforming electoral 
institutions to ensure a broader representation of views within legislatures would . . . make 
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 143. Ekeli, supra note 40, at 440. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See, e.g., Depoorter, supra note 68, at 116–17 (describing how public officials used the 
“blame game” following Hurricane Katrina to reduce political accountability). 
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pay compensation to the losers.”146 Thus, bringing the generations into 
the same time space would force legislators to address future-
generation issues head-on.147 
At the same time, there is also a risk that F-parties and their 
representatives will take on too great an influence in parliamentary 
politics. If introducing F-representatives prevents either one of the 
major political parties from garnering a governing majority in the 
legislatures, these present-generation parties may be forced to form 
coalitions with a minority F-party or parties, thus making the F-
parties kingmakers.148 This is a common scenario in countries that 
have proportional-representation voting systems that lead to 
multiparty legislatures.149 If this were to occur, it might actually give 
the F-parties too much power and upset the previously agreed-on 
balance between present and future interests. 
Finally, present generations may be more carefree and assume 
that posterity’s interests are represented elsewhere, thus excluding 
those interests from their decisionmaking calculus. If this occurs, then 
posterity-oriented legislatures have the perverse effect of making 
policies less attractive to posterity. In this situation, Professor Ekeli’s 
dependence on the deliberative democracy model150 would actually 
hurt posterity by giving decisions added legitimacy because of the 
supposed representation of future generations. 
There are real limits on the extent to which present generations 
are willing to relinquish power to future generations. Even if present 
generations are somewhat interested in looking out for future 
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generations, a free-rider problem would result. Not only would one 
be better off if a previous generation started implementing this value, 
one would be worse off if one’s own generation began this trend.151 
Therefore, no generation would have an incentive to incorporate this 
system and, if implemented, every generation would have an 
incentive to shirk its duty to future generations. The future 
generation cannot force the present generation to consider its 
interests any more than the present generation can punish past 
generations for not considering its interests. 
B. An Alternative Proposal: Tying Policy Outcomes to Legislators’ 
Pensions 
One way of addressing the problem of policy myopia and 
indifference toward future generations is to affect the decisional 
calculus of policymakers. Legislators normally are motivated to 
provide constituency services and to vote on legislative proposals in 
ways that assure their reelection.152 As such, even an ideological claim 
of looking out for posterity interests will succumb to the short-term 
political realities.153 Incumbents not seeking reelection or without a 
competitive challenger may have somewhat greater autonomy over 
policy choices, but they still have no incentive to represent future 
generations. 
The proposal laid out in this Section gives incumbents that 
incentive. Members of Congress continue to enjoy a fairly generous 
pension plan.154 A National Taxpayers Union Foundation study 
 
 151. Consider the creation of a pension system. If retirees receive benefits without having to 
pay into the system, they are unjustly enriched. If the program abruptly stops—or becomes 
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 152. This focus on the short term can create poor results in the long run: 
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 154. PATRICK J. PURCELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RETIREMENT BENEFITS FOR 
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estimates that the Congressional pension plans are two to three times 
more generous than plans of similarly situated employees in the 
private sector.155 These plans are a benefit that does not depend on 
the manner in which a member of Congress served.156 As of 2007, 
even members convicted of most types of felonies still qualified for 
the pension plan.157 
This Note proposes an alternative that would change the pension 
system by tying the pension payments to the outcomes—or the more 
refined projections—of policies developed, sponsored, or voted for by 
the legislator while in office. Although measuring the performance of 
a legislator may be imperfect, it would be possible to create metrics—
specific measures by which to judge the long-term effectiveness of a 
particular policy initiative158—for the policy itself and thus reward (or 
punish) the proponents (or opponents) of the particular bill. 
Politicians frequently embed accountability mechanisms into their 
policies;159 under this proposal, they would be holding themselves 
accountable rather than other actors. 
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Every individual vote could be essentially converted into a 
futures commodity. Voting for or against a bill would entail the same 
cost initially. The price of this commodity would then fluctuate based 
on the likelihood of reaching the policy’s embedded expectations. 
These futures contracts could be traded freely among both current 
and former legislators to ensure that the price is a fair predictor of the 
expectations. If, for example, Policy A was up for a vote, purchasing a 
“yea” vote would cost $100 and purchasing a “nay” vote would cost 
$100. Policy A would include in the statutory language a set of long-
term expectations and metrics by which to measure these 
expectations or some other proxy for the predicted impact of the 
policy. As time passed, the “yea” and “nay” vote commodities for 
Policy A would change in value, depending on the likelihood of these 
expectations being realized. If Policy A was a cap-and-trade program 
that successfully reduced carbon emissions consistent with 
expectations, then the “yea” vote would be worth more, and 
legislators that had this vote in their portfolios would ultimately 
receive larger pension payments. Conversely, those that opposed this 
bill would see a corresponding decrease in the value of their portfolio. 
The initiation of a future commodities contract could only occur 
during the legislative vote to prevent legislators from waiting to see 
the policy’s impact before determining what type of contract to 
purchase—a “yea” contract or a “nay” contract. But legislators could 
trade or buy other legislators’ contracts. They might even be bundled 
so that consistent votes on similar policies would share the same 
market and thus improve fluidity. The legislature might also 
determine how much value each initial vote should have and whether 
the purchase price should vary depending on the importance of the 
policy being discussed. 
This proposal might initially seem a far-fetched scheme, but a 
similar experimental market already exists in the Iowa Electronic 
Market (IEM).160 The IEM “is a real-money, small-scale futures 
exchange in which the ultimate values of the contracts traded are 
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 160. Iowa Electronic Markets, http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/ (last visited Apr. 31, 2008). 
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determined by political events, financial events and economic 
indicators.”161 Like a real market, investors use their own money to 
trade listed contracts for loss or profit.162 
Each contract to be listed on the IEM is defined in terms of a name 
(to uniquely identify the contract), a “fundamental” on which the 
contract is based, an expiration date, and a liquidation value. The 
fundamental consists of some statistic or set of statistics which can 
be objectively measured, and the liquidation value will depend upon 
the value of the fundamental on some pre-specified date. Typically, 
each contract will be part of a set of contracts, and all contracts in a 
set will be based on the same fundamental.163 
This Note’s proposal would function similarly; the 
“fundamental” would be the set of expected outcomes embedded in 
the legislation and those opposing the legislation would function as 
the other side of the contract. There might also be a way to structure 
legislation so that if it is a revenue-generating activity (like building a 
toll road), legislators could earn a percentage of the proceeds. 
The system would not be mandatory; instead, legislators could 
opt in. But with such an arrangement, legislators could translate their 
rhetorical concern for future interests164 into expectations of what 
their policies will do for these future generations. From these 
expectations, the legislators could then determine what the 
consequences to their pensions would be if the policies do or do not 
meet these expectations. 
Some legislative initiatives would likely extend beyond a given 
legislator’s career. Even if initiatives such as these were still ongoing 
when a legislator retired, the likelihood of future effectiveness could 
still be gauged to some extent and the past policy action valued 
accordingly. Thus, political accountability would extend even beyond 
the legislators’ retirement. Finally, there may be constitutional 
problems to this proposal, such as legislative entrenchment,165 that 
would require a constitutional amendment for resolution. 
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This proposal is not a silver bullet. For example, although it 
would be unnecessary to decide ahead of time how much weight to 
give future interests, the extent to which future outcomes affected 
legislators’ pensions would implicitly create a discount rate. Thus, 
present-generation representatives would have to determine the 
value of the future-generation benefits in the accountability system. 
But there determination would be transparent. 
On balance, this proposal more ably addresses or avoids the 
concerns laid out for posterity-oriented legislatures. First, it would 
not need to decide F-parties or F-voters —and thus no double-voting 
issue would present itself—because the traditional electoral system 
remains intact. What would—hopefully—change is the political 
discourse. Considerations of future interests would not merely be a 
legislative issue; they would become a campaign issue. How 
candidates consider future interests and to what extent they factor 
into issue positions would affect the present-generation electorate’s 
voting behavior. But instead of relying on inflated rhetoric, voters 
would base decisions on tangible proposals with a built-in 
accountability system. This accountability forces the legislators as 
candidates to make some tough choices. They would be forced to 
balance electoral pressures and ideological commitments with their 
own financial security.  
Second, the appropriate ideology for the representation of 
posterity would remain a contested question. Any present-generation 
representative could be a future representative. It would be an opt-in 
system, so that if legislators did not want to disturb their defined 
benefit, they would not have to “purchase” these commodities. Doing 
so would be suspicious because it would essentially confess a lack of 
interest in the future or at least demonstrate that the individual 
legislator is very pessimistic about the chances that the legislator’s 
supported policies would achieve their intended effects. This proposal 
does not preordain what the future interests are or what the 
 
cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature.”); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES 90 (“Acts of parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments 
bind not. . . . Because the legislature, being in truth the sovereign power, is always of equal, 
always of absolute authority: it acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature 
must have been, if it’s [sic] ordinances could bind the present parliament.”). But see Eric A. 
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1666 
(2002) (“The rule barring legislative entrenchment should be discarded; legislatures should be 
allowed to bind their successors, subject to any independent constitutional limits in force.”). 
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appropriate ideology to realize those interests is. Instead, it builds in 
accountability by connecting present actors with future interests. 
Despite these attributes, the proposed system would also have 
flaws. First, it might encourage voters to reelect incumbents, creating 
greater numbers of career politicians, because there would be an even 
greater incentive to fight long policy battles to protect prior 
investments in certain policy choices. Second, some of the 
calculations necessary to realize this proposal might be unsavory. For 
example, how much should the death of a soldier on the battlefield 
cost a politician in retirement? Third, other calculations might be 
difficult to make because it will be difficult to value some of the 
policy’s aims. For example, what is the value of national security? 
These problems are surmountable. The development of future 
commodities markets such as the Iowa Electronic Market 
demonstrates that the outcomes of a policy alter the pensions of its 
supporters and opponents.166 Legislators (or more likely their staff) 
could trade these credits and potentially even bequeath them to their 
successors. The point is that the creation of this market would make 
the future success of policies a commodity and tie politicians’ future 
incomes to this commodity. They would have a real incentive to care 
about future generations and monitor past policies so that they 
positively affect their own interests and, consequently, posterity. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the potentially “enormous impact” of legislative policies 
on future generations, policymakers do not adequately consider 
posterity’s interests when legislating. Although several environmental 
ethicists have proposed the idea of assigning certain legislators to 
represent posterity’s interests, the proposal has received little serious 
attention from the legal academy. Although this critique does not 
claim to be a comprehensive evaluation of the proposal’s promise and 
flaws, this Note makes the persistent questions regarding this 
proposal clearer and readier for resolution. 
Whether society ultimately recognizes its obligation to future 
generations and institutionalizes it in the form of a posterity-oriented 
legislature is a question of policy and a question of ethics. It is easier 
to accomplish this goal, though, if the proposal is more feasible and 
effective. Linking legislative pensions to the performance of 
 
 166. See supra notes 160–63 and accompanying text. 
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legislative enactments while the legislator was in office would create 
an accountability mechanism for present-generation legislators’ 
promises to future generations. By further developing this approach, 
society may develop a system that encourages legislators to better 
account for the impact policies have on future generations. In doing 
so, present generations may better realize their commitment to 
posterity. 
